Monat: August 2005

I’m on Google Talk

After lots of rumours, Google has finally released its new IM solution, Google Talk, at least as beta. Since GT uses the open XMPP („Jabber„) protocol, it was quite easy for me to sign on. If you’re on GT, look me up under

The „right“ community

So, in the postmodern world, truth is somehow defined by the community — "local" truth, that is. This is a necessary step, because postmodern thinkers do not believe in the autonomous, thinking self anymore (does that sound like a contradiction, or what?). But then, who or what defines the community? It cannot be the sum of all its individual members, because they are undefinable, in a flux, ever-changing, nothing, really. The only thing that I can up with is that the community is somehow defined by a shared, local truth. But see, here we have a problem. The community defines the truth which defines the community. At the end, both community and truth become totally arbitrary, meaningless values. And we all succumb to the usual postmodern depression, fall into Derrida’s abyss, or whatever …

But, wait! Maybe there’s hope. There’s one community — yes, you guessed right: I am talking, as usual, about the Spirit-filled community — which is not defined by a circular (non-)definition, but rather by an external standard. The Spirit which indwelles all of the believers is the defining factor of the community and the source of its truth (which, we claim, is more than just local). So this community is different. It is unique. Maybe it is the "right" one.

Now, that sounds awfully exclusivist (and, therefore, oppressive). But, is it exclusive, when there are no other candidates to be excluded?

The endless chain of meta^n-narratives

How can you seriously reject a metanarrative? Postmodern thinkers who do claim it is terrible how individual "local" narratives elevate themselves to meta-narratives beyond the
scope of their community context and claim to be universal, thereby judging other local narratives inferior. I’d say, by the same standards, the meta-meta-narrative of postmodernism, which elevates itself even higher, beyond all supposedly universal meta-narratives, judges them inferior and even oppressively rejects them as false, thus claiming to be the only true narrative itself, should be regarded as more horrid. But, in saying so, am I not creating a meta-meta-meta-narrative? Then, again, if I was, you’d never be able to tell me, because your statement would constitute a meta-meta-meta-meta-narrative. I think I’d better stop right here. Isn’t this ridiculous?

The God, who came into the cave

In The Leap of Reason (1976), British philosopher (I refuse to call him a theologian) Don Cupitt uses a modification Plato’s well known allegory of the philosopher in the cave to demonstrate the absence of meaning in all God-talk. In Cupitt’s cave, there are no shadows of the outside world on the walls, simply because the cave does not have an opening. Living in the cave, an observer does not have the slightest indication of the very existence of something like an "outside world." In the language of the cave’s population, vocabulary about such an outside world is therefore not needed and utterly meaningless.
Don Cupitt’s analogy actually does work very well in the artificial world he has constructed for his example. What is missing, however, are parallels to the real world. For here, in our real world, there is no closed cave — at least, not any more. Not since the God from outside has decided to come into the cave and reveal himself through his son Jesus Christ, who opened up the way into the world beyond for us. Read Hebrews 1:1ff, and talk about meaningless God-language!

Paul Ricoeur on the constant core of the self

In another chapter of his book, Thiselton shortly expound Paul Ricoeur’s model (mainly based on Time and Narrative, vol. 3) of self-identity. Ricoeur touches on the age-old quest for the “constant core” of the self, the element which links all individual experiences, impressions and moments into a coherent person. The basic problem has always been, that the self, as far as we know it, is anything but constant. With every moment, every experience, and every new element of learning the self is changing (This assumption is actually the very basis of the so-called “hermeneutical circle”). Yet, we always speak of this ever-changing self as “the same person.”

In RicoeurÂ’s model, there is no constant, unifying core of the self. Yet, at the same time, it is not reduced to the helpless self of postmodernity, either. Rather, there is something which provides an external structure to self-identity: narrative. The self cannot be understood apart from its temporality, its embedding into an ongoing narrative, whose plot helps to determine who exactly the individual is at any given time.

I find RicoeurÂ’s model attractive for a number of reasons:

  1. It provides good reason to abandon old dualistic models of the human being – seeing that the efforts to split a person into elements like body and soul usually just mark the attempt to find the one element that could be the “constant core.”
  2. It makes all the more sense once the right narrative is chosen: I am who I am not because of any constant element in my personality. I am who I am because I am part of GodÂ’s great narrative, in which he has chosen to love this ever-changing self as my person.
  3. It contains a further important parallel to Christian soteriology. While the self is always constantly shaped by its experience and by the unfolding narrative plot, Ricoeur allows for a special case: a major change or shift in the plot of the underlying narrative may lead to a complete “reconstitution” of the self. Now, wouldn’t the moment where you are transformed from a sinner to a saint in the eyes of God have to be considered a major plot change? What is “reconstituted” would then be the “new creation”/the “new man” the New Testament is always talking about.

Thiselton on textual interpretation and the self

Continuing my reading of Thiselton’s Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipulation and Promise, I have come upon a very interesting series of points on textual interpretation. Thiselton presents a model that seems to reverse the usual direction in interpretation, which moves from the — supposedly objective — interpreter towards the text as an object to be examined. In a chapter, which he entitles "Five Ways in which Textual Reading Interprets the Self", he offers the following list:

  1. First of all, the text conveys information and impressions about the author to the reader. This, however, seems to be a rather subordinate function in Thiselton’s model.
  2. As the text talks to its reader, it has an effect on the person of the reader himself. Of course, this point (as well as all of the following), seems especially important when we’re talking about a Biblical text, where the word of God is certainly supposed to have an effect on the reader.
  3. As soon as the text begins to touch on the realm of the self’s understanding, the reader begins to learn new things about himself by means of the text. In the words of Ernst Fuchs, the text first becomes the translator of the self before the self can even begin to translate the text.
  4. Next, the interpreting self reveals a lot about himself through the interpretation. People can be seen as belonging to a certain community, for example, just by looking at the way they will handle a particular text.
  5. Finally, the text transforms the individual. In hermeneutical terms, the text — or rather, whatever the reader gathers from it — becomes part of the reader’s set of presuppositions, pre-judgements, and prejudices, which will influence his reading of any other text from now on.

So far, I am not entirely sure what to make of Thiselton’s list. I’ll have to think about it. To be sure, it presents an interesting alternative to the one-sided empiricist view of textual interpretation which stands at the basis of modernity. However, while this might provide a much needed counterweight, I think it’s jumping the ship on the opposite side: What I am missing is a clear indication of the role the informational content of the text is supposed to play in the whole of interpretation. Of course, Thiselton does say a couple of words on this in the last paragraph of his chapter, namely, that a certain understanding of informational content might even be a prerequisite for transformation. Yet, I still get the feeling that this is not enough.

As so often, the truth between the two extremes seems to lie somewhere in the middle (Shannon Buckner should love this: "It’s all about balance …").

Über Christoph

Christoph Fischer (* 1978) ist Pfarrer der Evangelischen Landeskirche in Württemberg auf der Pfarrstelle „Erlöserkirche“ in Albstadt-Tailfingen.

Christoph ist verheiratet mit Rebecca. Gemeinsam haben sie drei Töchter.